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The multivariate theory of similarity discussed by Ennis (1988) entails the assumption that individual category exemplars are themselves represented psychologically as distributions of individual exemplars. The potential utility of this exemplar-distribution approach for theories relating selective attention, similarity, and categorization is briefly discussed. Nosofsky (1986) proposed and tested a unified quantitative approach to modeling performance in tasks of multidimensional stimulus identification and categorization. The approach was based on the assumption that both identification and categorization decisions are governed by similarity comparisons with individually stored exemplars. By modeling patterns of identification confusions, a multidimensional scaling solution for the exemplars was derived. This solution was then used in conjunction with the exemplar-similarity model to predict performance in four separate categorization conditions with the same set of stimuli. A key component assumption was that selective attention processes may systematically modify distances among exemplars in the multidimensional psychological space.
On the Similarity Gradient
Detailed quantitative analyses of the identification and categorization data (Nosofsky, 1985b (Nosofsky, , 1986 ) revealed a "Gaussian" relation between similarity and psychological distance. This Gaussian relation runs counter to Shepard's (1987) proposed universal law of generaliTation, in which similarity is presumed to be an exponential decay function of psychological distance. (For comparisons between the Gaussian and exponential gradients applied to confusion data, see, e.g., Nosofsky, 1985a Nosofsky, , 1985b . Commenting on Nosofsky (1986) , Shepard (1986) drew a distinction between failures of perceptual discrimination and the process of generalization. The latter is a cognitive act on the part of an organism in which a new stimulus---clearly discriminable from a previously experienced one--is nevertheless judged to have the same consequences or belong to the same class as the original. Because Nosofsky (1986) modeled performance by using highly confusable stimuli, Shepard (1986) conjectured that the Gaussian similarity gradient may have been reflecting "irreducible noise in the perceptual/memory system" (p. 60)--not the "cognifive" form of similarity intrinsic to generalization. Ennis (1988) provided an elegant mathematical formulation of Shepard's (1986) proposal stemming from a multivarPreparation of this comment was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS 87-19938 to Indiana University.
Correspondence concerning this article' should be addressed to Robert M. Nosofsky, Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. iate theory of similarity (Ennis, Palen, & Mullen, in press; Mullen & Ennis, 1987 ; for related work, see Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Zinnes & MacKay, 1983) . As in classic Thurstonian approaches to modeling classification, presentation of a stimulus is assumed to result in some psychological representation. However, because of noise in the perceptual/memory system, a given stimulus will not yield the same internal representation each time it is presented; rather, there will be a distribution of psychological dispersions associated with a stimulus. Thus, instead of representing an exemplar as a single point in a psychological space (as assumed by Nosofsky, 1986) , a more appropriate model would represent each exemplar as a distribution of points in the psychological space. Figure 1 provides an illustration in which the psychological dispersions are assumed to be Gaussian distributed (cf. Green & Swets, 1966) . Following Shepard (1987) , the similarity between any two individual points in these distributions would be an exponential decay function of their psychological distance. But the overall similarity between the exemplars would reflect two components---the Gaussian distributed dispersions corresponding to each exemplar and the exponential similarity function. With highly confusable stimuli, the Gaussian noise would presumably swamp the cognitive similarity function, thereby explaining the pattern of results revealed in Nosofsky's (1985a Nosofsky's ( , 1985b analyses.
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DIMENSION 1 Figure 1 . Exemplars A and B are represented as two-dimensional, Ganssian distributed psychological dispersions. The similarity between any two individual dispersions, a and b, would be an exponential decay function of their psychological distance: so~ ffi exp(--d=b). The overall similarity between Exemplars A and B would reflect both the Gaussian noise and the exponential similarity function.
Utility of the Distributional Approach
Although the quantitative accuracy of Ennis's (1988) proposal remains to be tested, it strikes me as highly promising and conceptually well motivated. Nosofsky (1986) operated on the assumption that categories are represented psychologically as collections of individually stored exemplars. Ennis's proposal entails an assumption that is recursive with Nosofsky's (1986): Namely, the exemplars themselves are represented psychologically as collections of individually stored exemplars. That is, the psychological representation of the exemplar corresponds to the distribution of psychological dispersions it evokes. Incorporating this assumption within the framework of Nosofsky's (1986) categorization model would be an entirely natural extension. Instead of summing the similarity of a probe to individual exemplars, one would integrate over the similarity between the probe and the exemplar distributions.
Besides its potential for reconciling Nosofsky's (1985b Nosofsky's ( , 1986 work and Shepard's (1958 Shepard's ( , 1987 on the form of the similarity gradient, I believe the distributional approach to representing exemplars holds more general utility for theories of similarity and categorization. Ashby and Perrin (1988) illustrated a variety of empirical phenomena dealing with stimulus similarity that are interpretable in terms of a distri- Figure 2 . Exemplar distributions are illustrated as ellipses in a twodimensional psychological space, with the length of the major and minor axes of the ellipses representing the variability of the distributions along each dimension. Exemplars labeled 1 and 2 represent, respectively, members of Category 1 and 2. Dimension 1 is perfectly diagnostic for discriminating the categories. The figure illustrates selective attention to the relevant dimension in terms of reduced variability along that dimension, as in the process model of selective attention proposed by Luce, Green, and Weber (1976) . butional approach. Here I illustrate several additional examples that bear on what was the central theme of Nosofsky's 1986 article: Namely, selective attention processes may systematically modify similarities among exemplars across different categorization conditions. Selective attention was described in Nosofsky's (1986) model in terms of stretching and shrinking of distances in a psychological space (Carroll & Wish, 1974) , but a process interpretation was not forthcoming. In terms of the distributional approach, selective attention can be represented by decreased variability of the exemplar distributions along the attended dimensions (cf. Luce, Green, & Weber, 1976) . Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows two categories that can be perfectly discriminated on the basis of values on Dimension 1. Presumably, people would attend selectively to this dimension, resulting in less variable psychological dispersions. Thus the exemplars would be less similar along Dimension 1, and between-category discriminability would increase. Besides selective attention to a dimension (as illustrated in Figure 2 ), other forms of selective attention may be possible. For example, Garner (1978) considered the idea of selective attention to individual stimuli. Figure 3a illustrates an attempt to represent selective attention to a single stimulus in terms of increased distances between that stimulus and its neighbors in the psychological space. The problem with the representation is that distances and structural relations among the remaining stimuli in the set have also perforce been changed. A distributional approach to representing selective attention to the single stimulus is illustrated in Figure 3b and may offer a more attractive alternative. The representation in Figure 3b may also reflect what happens when an individual exemplar is presented with high frequency (Nosofsky, 1988) . In addition to increased traces of the exemplar being laid down in memory, these memory traces may become more differentiated from the remaining exemplars in the set (Gibson & Gibson, 1955) .
To summarize, the distributional approach to representing exemplars offers intriguing potential for developing increas-ingly accurate and powerful models of relations among selective attention, similarity, and categorization.
